Liquidity Providing
Liquidity is added to Flash Trade pools by liquidity providers (LPs) who deposit assets to facilitate trading. Each trade that passes through Flash protocol generates dynamic fees, and LPs earn their pro-rata share of these revenues while serving as the counterparty to all trader positions.
How Liquidity Providing Works
When you provide liquidity to Flash Trade, you deposit assets into multi-asset pools that traders use for perpetual trading. In return, you receive FLP tokens representing your pool ownership and earn fees from all trading activity.
Revenue Sources for LPs
LPs generate yield through multiple fee streams:
Open/Close Position Fees: Charged on every trade execution
Margin Fees: Continuous fees on leveraged positions
Swap Fees: When users convert between pool assets
Liquidation Bonuses: Remaining collateral from liquidated positions
Add/Remove Liquidity Fees: Dynamic fees from other LPs joining/leaving
Additionally, when traders lose money, those losses flow directly to LPs as profits.
Choosing Your LP Token Type
Flash offers two liquidity providing options with different reward mechanisms:
FLP vs sFLP Tokens
Flash offers two types of liquidity providing tokens with different reward mechanisms:
Reward Style
Auto-compounds into token price
Paid out in USDC every hour
Fee Share
70% of protocol fees
70% of protocol fees
Tradability
Buyable/sellable on markets
Mint-only, non-tradable
Management
Set-and-forget
Active reward collection required
Voltage Points
Yes
Yes
Best For
Passive investors
Users wanting direct USDC payouts
Getting Started
Choose Your Pool
Select from FLP.1 (main crypto pool) or FLP.3 (Solana DeFi pool)
Select Token Type
Decide between auto-compounding FLP or manual-claim sFLP
Deposit Assets
Add any supported pool asset (optimal deposits help balance ratios)
Receive LP Tokens
Get FLP/sFLP tokens representing your pool share
Earn Fees
Start earning from all trading activity immediately

Dynamic Fee Structure
Minting and burning FLP tokens incurs fees that vary based on pool composition:
Fee Optimization:
Lower Fees: Deposit underweight assets (below target ratio)
Higher Fees: Deposit overweight assets (above target ratio)
Balance Incentive: Fee structure naturally encourages pool balance
Burning Fee Components:
Dynamic fee based on pool balance after withdrawal
Additional 5bps penalty to discourage frequent withdrawals
Fees help maintain pool stability and long-term LP profitability
How APRs are displayed on Flash Trade's Earn page
Flash Trade's Earn page shows two different return calculations:
Default Display: 7-day rolling average APR
Hover Display: Previous day's annualized return
These numbers reflect actual LP performance including all fee sources and trader PnL.

Risk in providing Liquidity to Flash Liquidity Pools
LPs should be aware of the following risks when providing liquidity:
Trader Utilization Risk: In a Pool-to-Peer system, LPs are constantly borrowing exposure to their assets appreciation in exchange for trading fees (both open/close and margin fees). This implies that LPs serve as the counterparty to traders on average. It is possible for traders to be on the right side of trades across relatively long times (months) but in the long run, Flash's fee structure and pricing engine will not allow for profits in the long run.
Asset Depreciation Risk: Since FLP is made up partially of crypto currency assets, its value will fluctuate with the prices of those assets. There is Trader Utilization Risk as described above that will amplify or mitigate this effect in the short-term but in the long run, if crypto prices increase, LPs returns will follow and vice-versa.
Latency Risk: In the case that the used oracle is providing a delayed price, a trader may be able to overcome the fee structure to provide themselves with consistently +EV trades. Flash's internal risk systems monitors all traders for behavior that would signify this is happening and adjust fees and spreads to ensure such trading is not possible.
Smart Contract Risk: There is a possibility of on-chain contract logic being exploited. The team's code has been double audited in order to lower this possibility as much as possible.
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